Can You Use a Power of Attorney to Change a RRSP Beneficiary?

Keith Hawthorne designated his common law spouse, Colleen Desharnais, as the beneficiary of his Registered Retirement Savings Plan at the Toronto Dominion Bank. He also appointed her his attorney under his enduring power of attorney. In fact, he completed two powers of attorney naming her as his attorney each time. But, Keith Hawthorne did not make her beneficiary of his will.

Mr. Hawthorne suffered a brain tumor. He had surgery. Twice. But he lost his competency to make decisions, and he never recovered. Ms. Desharnais was able to assist with his finances, using the power of attorney.

A representative of TD Securities Inc., which is a related company to the Toronto Dominion Bank, suggested to Ms. Desharnais that she could get a better return for Mr. Hawthorne if she transferred the RRSP to TD Securities Inc. She followed the advice, transferring the RRSP to TD Securities Inc.

When she transferred the RRSP, she did not complete the designation of beneficiary form. She assumed the beneficiary would remain the same. TD Securities Inc.’s representative did not advise her about completing the form.

Mr. Hawthorne passed away the following year. TD Securities Inc. paid the RRSP to Mr. Hawthorne’s estate because the designation of beneficiary form was not completed when the RRSP was transferred to TD Securities Inc.

Ms. Desharnais sued both the Toronto Dominion Bank and TD Securities Inc.

In the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Desharnais v. Toronto Dominion Bank, 2001 BCSC 1695, Mr. Justice Clancy held that Ms. Desharnais’ power of attorney did not give her the legal authority to change the designated beneficiary of a RRSP.

Although, the power of attorney gave Ms. Deshaanrais the power to do on behalf of Mr. Hawthorne anything that Mr. Hawthorne could lawfully do by an attorney, this power did not include things that were testamentary (or, as I like to think of it, Will-like) in nature.

Mr. Justice Clancy adopted the following statement from the Legal Education Society of Alberta in its report entitled Enduring Powers of Attorney; Dependent Adults; Living Wills (1991):

It is questionable whether a donor may designate a beneficiary of a pension, insurance policy or Registered Retirement Savings Plan [using a power of attorney]. In the absence of statutory authority to designate a beneficiary, these acts would be testamentary in nature, since they would be "dependant on death for its vigour and effect” (footnote omitted), and accordingly must comply with the Wills Act. It might be possible to designate a beneficiary by an attorney while the donor has capacity but it would be advisable for an attorney to seek the advice and directions of the court if his donor no longer has capacity.

The change in beneficiary—from Ms. Desharnais to no one—was not legal. According to Mr. Justice Clancy,

A valid transfer of the RSP would have required the continuation of the designation of Ms. Desharnais as beneficiary. That action would have been authorized by the power of attorney. It would not have been testamentary in nature.

Mr. Justice Clancy found that TD Securities Inc. and its representative owed Ms. Desharnais a duty to inquire if Mr. Hawthorne had named a beneficiary on the Toronto Dominion Bank RRSP, and advise her to complete the designation to maintain the beneficiary. He held that TD Securities Inc. was liable to pay her the amount of the RRSP she would have received as the beneficiary plus interest on the basis that it was negligent and in breach of its fiduciary duty (or duty of loyalty) to her.

Mr. Justice Clancy also held the Toronto Dominion Bank liable to Ms. Desharnais, on the basis that the Toronto Dominion Bank had a duty to hold the funds instead of permitting an illegal transaction. But, the British Columbia Court of Appeal reversed Mr. Justice Clancy’s holding that the Toronto Dominion Bank was negligent. The Court of Appeal said that Ms. Deshnarnais had not met the onus to establish the scope of the Toronto Dominion Bank’s duty of care to her.

The Court of Appeal did uphold the judgment against TD Securities Inc. You can read the Court of Appeal’s decision here.

It is important that anyone appointed an attorney under a power of attorney, and the financial institutions that deal with the attorney, recognize the limitations on what an attorney may lawfully do under a power of attorney. In this case, the financial institutions involved didn’t until it was too late.

The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment

The law in British Columbia is clear that a mentally capable adult may refuse medical treatment, even if his doctors and family consider it to be in his best interests. The Supreme Court of Canada has recently said that the “right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is fundamental to a person’s dignity and autonomy.” There are a number of reasons why a patient may wish to reject his doctor’s recommended treatment: religious grounds, concern about side effects, or concern about risks. In fact, the law protects the right of a competent patient to make foolish decisions.

But what if the patient is mentally ill?

Professor Starson is not a college or university professor. He is a brilliant physicist who has published several papers in his field. Other physicists respect him, and refer to him as Professor Starson. He has also been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and has been in and out of mental institutions in Canada and the United States. He was involuntarily committed to an institution in Ontario after he had uttered threats against others. He apparently suffers from delusions. He claims to be leading on the edge to build a starship, and that he is a world class skier and arm wrestler.

Professor Starson’s doctor prescribed various medications to alleviate his condition. The doctor is of the opinion that the medications might allow Professor Starson to function better outside of a mental institution and resume his scientific work, and that he would deteriorate without the medication.

The medication would slow down Professor Starson’s thinking. When Professor Starson had taken medications in the past, he found the side affects unbearable. His doctor was of the opinion that the new medications would not have as severe side affects as the medications Professor Starson had taken before. But Professor Starson was concerned that they would dull his thinking. For Professor Starson, the medication’s effects “would be worse than death for me, because I have always considered normal to be a term so boring it would be like death.”

Under the Ontario legislation (the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A) a patient has the right to refuse treatment if he has the ability “to understand the information that is relevant to making a decision about the treatment…and to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision.” He must be able to understand the information, apply it to his circumstances, and weigh the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment.

A Consent and Capacity Board in Ontario determined that Professor Starson did not have the capacity to refuse treatment. However, the Ontario courts disagreed, and set aside the Board’s decision. The case went to the Supreme Court of Canda.

On June 6, 2003, the Supreme Court of Canada published its decision in Starson v. Swayze, 2003 SCC 32. In a 6 to 3 decision, the majority held that Professor Starson had the right to refuse the medication. According to the majority, although Professor Starson did not agree with the diagnosis of mental illness, he had a sufficient insight into his condition to have the ability to understand the relevant information. He knew that he was not normal, and that he had some problems. The majority also found that there was no basis for the Consent and Capacity Board’s finding that Professor Starson did not appreciate the consequences of refusing treatment.

In practice, it can be very difficult to determine if someone with a significant mental illness has the capacity to refuse treatment. All of the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada agreed on the legal principles to be applied, but three of them found on the evidence that Professor Starson did not have the capacity to refuse treatment.

An Odd Case in the Credenza

I am sitting on my chair, facing my computer at my office. My desk is at my left, and my credenza is at my right. Inside my credenza are many file folders with photocopies of cases.

The file folders sometimes have topic labels on them such as “testamentary capacity,” “wills interpretation,” and “WVA [Wills Variation Act]." Some of them just say “research” on them. When I finish working on a case and close the case file, I take the photocopies of cases out of the case file, and put them in my credenza. I can then refer to the cases later.

Some of the files are stacked on one another, and some are vertical. At one time, several years ago, the files were organized alphabetically, by topic. Not now. Still, I do find what I am looking for, but I doubt anyone else could.

I am planning to work on a post on undue influence today. I am opening my credenza, in search of a folder with undue influence cases.

I see a folder marked “odd cases.” I can’t recall why I collected odd cases in a folder. I am intrigued. I will take a look.

Here is an old Ontario case called Lasby v. Crewson (1891), 21 O.R. 93 (Ch. D).

In 1891, Chancellor Boyd interpreted the following clause in Oliver Lasby’s will:

When my youngest son is of the age of eighteen years, my estate . . shall be divided among my children then living, that is to say, to each of my sons I leave two-thirds, and to each of my daughters, one-third of all my estate and effects.

After Oliver Lasby died, when his youngest son attained the age of 18, Oliver Lasby had twelve children then living.

In his judgment, Boyd C. remarked,

The will is said to be the work of a schoolmaster; his notions of fractions are peculiar, but it is a relief to think he belonged to a past generation, as the document dates back to 1859.

The court considered three possible interpretations:
1. The fractions were nonsensical, and the children should share equally;
2. The sons should share two-thirds of the estate, and the daughters one-third;
3. The estate should be divided so that each son should receive double the portion of each daughter.

Chancellor Boyd found that the testator intended to give each son double the portion given to each daughter. He held that the estate should be divided into seventeenths, with ten-seventeenths shared among the sons, and seven-seventeenths shared among the daughters.

It seems to me that here have been a few peculiar notions of fractions expressed in homemade wills since Boyd C. issued this judgment more than a century ago.

I really ought to organize my credenza. Not today though. It is a sunny Saturday in the Okanagan.

The undue influence post will have to wait.

Don't Say "Children Per Stirpes"

I have written previously about how I use the words "per stirpes" in a will or trust, as a method of distribution among issue (children, grandchildren, great grandchildren etc.). I find that a gift to "children per stirpes" or to a named person "per stirpes"is confusing. It can lead to problems in interpreting the document, and expensive court applications. (You can read my previous post explaining the meaning of the term "per stirpes," and in which I give some examples here.)

Recently, while doing some research on how Canadian courts have interpreted the phrase "children per stirpes," I came across a decision of Mr. Justice Cullity of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Lau v. Mak, 2004 CanLII 6673, in which he deplores the misuse of the terms. In his decision, he explains the meaning of the words "per stirpes" as follows:

It is hardly necessary to say that the words are not part of everyday linguistic usage. They are essentially words selected by lawyers engaged in drafting wills and they have a long-established, elaborate and precise meaning that is unlikely - to say the least - to be familiar, or apparent, to clients with no legal background. They refer essentially to the manner in which property is to be distributed between, or among, beneficiaries described in a will. They are not themselves descriptive of the beneficiaries. As contrasted with a per capita distribution, a distribution per stirpes effects a division of property in accordance with stirpes or stocks of descent. In ordinary language, a division in equal shares per stirpes will allocate one share to each family of beneficiaries while, under a per capita distribution, all beneficiaries will share equally.

Later in his judgment, Mr. Justice Cullity says,

If the words "per stirpes" are to be given their traditional, and technical, meaning, it is obviously essential that more than one stirps, or family, be represented in the description of the beneficiaries in the will. It is, I believe, for this reason that a gift to children of the testator, or of some other person, in equal shares per stirpes is, as White J. suggested in Re Fraser Estate (1986) 23 E.T.R. 57 (Ont. H.C.), at page 75, a contradiction in terms if the word "children" is to be given its natural - and its primary legal - meaning. Such gifts surface with regrettable frequency from time to time in Canada and their construction has given rise to difficulty.

Mr. Justice Cullity then cites decisions in which the courts have departed from the technical meaning of the phrase "per stirpes" and found them to be descriptive of the beneficiaries. He says that the courts have been reluctant to attribute ignorance or confusion about the concept to the professionals who have drafted the wills considered in those cases. But, Justice Cullity does not share that reluctance:

References to gifts per stirpes are, as I have indicated, essentially lawyers’ expressions and, unless constrained by authority, I would be inclined to interpret them in the light of their traditional meaning and ignore them if, so construed, the will is not intelligible without attributing an unusual meaning to the other words of the Will. I would do this not simply on the basis of the principle that technical terms are generally to be given their technical meaning but, also, because the term "per stirpes" is an essential and peculiarly valuable part of a drafter’s arsenal. Until such time as the proponents of plain-language drafting can find a simple substitute that will embrace all of the features of a stirpital decision that have been painstakingly elucidated in the past, the court should, I believe, be reluctant to accept, and impliedly approve, distortion of the concept. To do so would be to encourage sloppy drafting and to introduce uncertainty into a process in which certainty is always a principal objective. It is of the utmost importance to testators that their solicitors should be able to rely on the established meaning of legal terms. If it appears that the drafter has employed such terms in a different sense, I would, in the absence of a clear indication of the intended meaning, prefer to hold that the words were inserted by inadvertence or, by virtue of the drafter’s misunderstanding of the concept of a stirpital gift, and that no intelligible meaning should be attributed to them – rather than to speculate about the nature, and extent, of the misconception and then to speculate further as to what the drafter’s resulting intention may have been.

It may be that the words "per stirpes" are used differently in other jurisdictions, but in Canada, or at least in British Columbia and Ontario, don't say "children per stirpes."

Fort Steele Courthouse

Built in 1897, this building served as both the local government building and the courthouse, at Fort Steele, just north of Cranbrook, British Columbia. According to the Fort Steele website,

The origin of Fort Steele can be traced to the small settlement of Galbraith's Ferry, which was born during the 1864 Kootenay Gold Rush to Wild Horse Creek. In 1888 the settlement's name was changed to Fort Steele to honour Superintendent Samuel Benfield (Sam) Steele of the North-West Mounted Police , who peacefully reduced tensions between the Ktunaxa and the white and Chinese settlers who were relatively new to the area.

According to the histories I have read and heard, some of the townsfolk arrested two members of the Ktuaxa (or Kootenay) nation, locked them in the local jail, and accused them of the murder of two miners. Chief Isadore managed to set them free, and tensions mounted. Sam Steele negotiated with the Chief, who agreed to return the prisoners. Superintendent Steele then had a hearing, and after carefully examining the evidence, determined that there was insufficient evidence to convict. The two Ktuaxa were free.

Sam Steele appears to have had a true sense of justice toward all people, a sense not always shared by his contemporaries on the frontier.

You can read more about Sam Steele here and here.

This picture was taken by my wife, Michele, earlier this month. If you visit Fort Steele in the summer, I recommend the two day "Steele of a Deal" tickets.

Succession Law Reform Project Committee's Proposed Dependants' Relief Anti-Avoidance Clause is Inadequate

I am disappointed in the British Columbia Law Reform, Succession Law Reform Project’s recommended changes to the Wills Variation Act, RSBC 1996, c. 490, which I have described in a general way here. My biggest concern is that the recommendations fail to adequately protect spouses in cases where the deceased spouse has structured his or her affairs so that assets pass to other beneficiaries outside of the deceased’s estate.

In British Columbia, a spouse (including a person who has lived in a marriage-like relationship with the testator for at least two years) or child may apply to vary a will if adequate provision has not been made for the spouse or child in the will. The court may then award the child or spouse such provision as the court considers adequate, just and equitable in the circumstances.

But the Wills Variation Act only gives the court jurisdiction to make an award out of the deceased’s estate. This means that the court cannot make an award to the spouse or child from assets that pass outside of an estate such as assets held in a joint tenancy that pass by right-of-survivorship to the surviving joint tenancy, or to a designated beneficiary of an insurance policy.

It is possible for someone to have millions of dollars of assets immediately before their death, but leave no estate. For example, a father and husband might buy real estate, and hold it in a joint tenancy with an adult child from a previous marriage, designate the child the beneficiary of his Registered Retirement Income Funds and Life Insurance, and leave few assets remaining to fall into his estate. In this case, the wife could be effectively disinherited, with no recourse under the Wills Variation Act.

In the above scenario, the wife would have to persuade the court to declare that the child is holding assets in trust for the estate, or to set aside transactions in favor of the child on some other grounds. Or the wife might have some other claim to the assets, perhaps on the basis that she contributed to the assets or provided care to her husband, and the child would be unjustly enriched unless the court imposes a constructive trust on some of the assets in favor of the wife. But, the wife is in a much more difficult position than if the assets fell into the estate, and the husband had left the assets to the child in his will.

Why should the wife’s entitlement depend on whether the husband left his assets to the child under his will, or by structuring his affairs so that the child can receive the assets outside of his estate?

Most perversely, if the wife had left her husband, started a suit against him, and was granted an order that there was no reasonable prospect of reconciliation under the Family Relations Act, RSBC 1996, c. 128, thereby triggering her interest in family assets held in the husband's name, she would be in a stronger position than if she remained happily married to him until his death, perhaps caring for him when he was sick.

The Succession Law Reform Project subcommittee assigned to consider the Wills Variation Act was alive to this issue. The Subcommittee circulated a paper for comments proposing that death be treated as a triggering event under the Family Relations Act, which would give the surviving spouse the same right on the death of the other spouse as a separating spouse has on the breakdown of the marriage.

I felt that this was at least an improvement over the current legislation, but that it would be preferable to extend the ambit of the Wills Variation Act so that it applies to assets that flow outside of an estate, such as jointures and life insurance. I wrote in response to the request for comments suggesting that the Succession Law Reform Project consider proposing legislation similar to Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c. S26.

The Committee has rejected this approach. According to the final Report at pages 62-3:

The Intestate Succession, Wills Variation Act and Family Relations Act Issues Subcommittee initially concluded that there was no need for anti-avoidance measures if a surviving spouse could elect within a limited time after the death of the other spouse to exercise the right to a division of family assets on the basis of Part 5 of the Family Relations Act.

Consultation with the family law Bar, however, led to the conclusion that there are too many difficulties in the way of introducing such an election under British Columbia’s current matrimonial property regime in Part 5 of the Family Relations Act. Once the proposal for a post-mortem spousal election was abandoned, anti-avoidance provisions were revisited. Provisions similar to those in the Ontario Succession Law Reform Act and other Canadian statutes involving the inclusion of the value of asset dispositions by the deceased in a notional estate and clawback powers were reviewed.

These, however, were thought by the Project Committee to be overly intrusive. Ultimately, a provision was conceived that operates by analogy to the Fraudulent Conveyance Act. This provision treats transactions by the deceased conferring a benefit on a second person with the intent to defeat rights under the dependants relief provisions of Part 5 as voidable at the instance of eligible claimants whose rights are or could be diminished by them. It does not apply to transactions entered into by the second person in good faith, for valuable consideration, and without notice or knowledge of the deceased’s purpose at the time of the transaction.

A court could make any order in respect of a transaction voidable under this provision that it could have made under the Fraudulent Conveyance Act. These could include making the property involved in the transaction subject to seizure and sale to satisfy an order giving relief under the Act to an eligible claimant, declaring the property is held in trust for the purpose of satisfying the order, ordering that the amounts payable under the order form a charge on the property, or directing a judicial sale. [footnotes omitted]

With respect, this remedy is inadequate.

The Fraudulent Conveyance Act, RSBC 1996, c. 163, allows a claimant to set aside transactions if “made to delay, hinder or defraud creditors and others of their lawful remedies.”

In Hossay v. Newman (Feb. 5, 1998), BCSC, Kelowna Registry 27559, the court held that an independent adult child who had no claim independent of a Wills Variation Act claim, was not a “creditor or other” under the legislation.

On the other hand, in Jack v. Parkinson (1994), 91 B.C.L.R. (2d) (C.A.), the Plaintiff’s husband transferred land to his common law spouse. His legal spouse from whom he had been separated sought to set aside the transfer. Mr. Justice Goldie said at page 98, “There is no doubt in my mind that Mrs. Jack [the Plaintiff] falls within the words in the statute, ‘creditors and others.’” On the facts, the court held that there was no fraudulent intent, and upheld the trial judge’s decision dismissing the claim.

Accordingly, spouses are already be able to set aside transactions if they can show that the deceased intended to avoid their claims, and that at the time of the transactions they had claims independent of the Wills Variation Act. But, they have to prove fraudulent intent. As a practical matter, in the case of spousal claims it is not clear that the Committee’s proposed remedy adds much to the current law--although admittedly the law is not now clear, and the proposal would clarify the law somewhat.

There are cases where spouses can be left with little or nothing because of the deceased spouse’s poor planning, or because of changes in circumstances, rather than because the deceased intended to defeat the survivor's potential Wills Variation Act claim. I have seen cases where one spouse attempts to find a fair balance between his or her spouse, and children from a previous marriage, but does not fully appreciate the needs of his or her spouse. Would the proposed remedy apply in such circumstances? I don’t know.

Supposing the husband prepares his estate plan at a time when he has significant assets. He plans to leave significant assets to his wife, worth well over one million dollars. He designates his children as the beneficiaries of a half-million dollar life insurance policy. He has no intent to avoid the Wills Variation Act. He suffers of business reversal, and dies bankrupt. But the life insurance is exempt from creditors. His children get the life insurance, and his wife gets nothing. Would the wife have any remedy under the Committee’s proposed anti-avoidance clause?

If the a deceased spouse fails to make adequate provision for the surviving spouse, and has significant assets that pass to other beneficiaries outside of his or her estate, why should the surviving spouse’s remedy depend on whether the deceased spouse intended to avoid the Wills Variation Act or the proposed new dependants' relief legislation?

How is it anymore intrusive to vary how life insurance proceeds are distributed than to vary a will? The Committee does not elaborate.

Ontario Estate Planning and Litigation Blog

One of the fun things about the internet is stumbling across great sites. I experience a wonderful sense of discovery. The other day I found an Ontario estate planning and estate litigation blog from the firm Hull & Hull LLP in Toronto. It consists of posts and podcasts directed towards other lawyers. The contributors are Ian Hull and Suzana Popovic-Montag. Check it out here.

How Seniors May Defer Property Taxes in B.C.

The cost of property taxes can be significant for seniors on fixed incomes. This can be particularly troublesome for homeowners whose property values have gone up significantly more than the average increases in values, such as owners of lakefront or oceanfront property in British Columbia. There are many seniors who have had modest incomes and lifestyles over the years, whose property values and property tax burden have increased considerably. What if a senior can’t afford to pay the property taxes, but doesn’t want to sell his or her home?

In British Columbia, you can enter into an agreement with the provincial government to defer property taxes on your principal residence if you are 60 years or over [since writing this post, the age has been lowered to 55 years or over], have lived in British Columbia for at least one year, are a Canadian Citizen or Permanent Resident, and have at least 25% equity in your property. The agreement is registered against the title to your home, and the provincial government pays the taxes. When the agreement ends, you repay the province the amount of the property taxes, plus interest. The interest is relatively low.

If you wish to sell your house, you must pay the deferred property taxes and the interest. The Land Title Office will not allow the title to be transferred unless the amount owing under the agreement is being paid out. There is an exception for property transferred at death to a surviving spouse.

I was advised by a representative of the Ministry responsible for the deferment program that the amount must be repaid if an agreement for sale is registered on title.

Persons under 55 with disabilities may also be eligible to defer the property taxes.

Because the interest rates are low, the land tax deferral program may be preferable to a reverse mortgage.

The Ministry of Small Business and Revenue has more information about the property tax deferment program here, and you can read the Land Tax Deferment Act, RSBC 1996, c. 249, here.

Happy 1st Birthday to Rule of Law Blog

A year-and-a-half ago, I had never heard of a blog. In June 2005, I met for coffee with Dave Bilinsky, who is a practice advisor with the Law Society of British Columbia. I am a fan of Dave’s, and I asked him to meet with me to get some ideas to help me gradually move my practice orientation to a practice more focused on wills, estate planning, and estate litigation. Dave made several suggestions, including that I start a blog.

I spent a couple of months reading blogs to get some ideas. On August 13, 2005, I posted my first article. I was not sure if I would think of enough things to write about, or have the time or discipline to post regularly.

A year later, I find that I have no difficulty in finding things to write about. I have more ideas on topics than time to write them. I find writing posts to be enjoyable. It feels like more of a hobby, than work.

Has the blog affected the amount of work that I am getting? I know of a few people who have contacted me after reading my blog, and my wills, estate planning and estate litigation practice is continuing to grow. But, my blog is not the only way I market my practice. In the short term, I don't know if "Rule of Law" has had a dramatic effect on the volume of work.

The impact that my blog has had on my practice and on me is subtler.

When I write, I step back from the immediate issues I am dealing with in my practice, and consider the broader legal and policy issues. I also read the latest wills, trust and estate cases from the British Columbia courts closely, so that I can write about them.

Because I am writing for everyone, from people with little or no knowledge of the law looking for basic information, to other lawyers, I have to work at writing in a way that anyone can understand. This improves my writing skills--or at least I hope it does.

I also read other blogs. In doing so, I learn about the law in other places, and get new ideas. I especially enjoy reading the other wills, trust and estate blogs. I feel that I am a part of a larger legal community, extending beyond my own province of British Columbia.

Writing a blog is invigorating.

Do I recommend writing a blog to lawyers and other professionals? It depends. If you enjoy writing about what you do and believe in, then I can’t think of anything better. If not, there are plenty of other ways to market your business.

But, I don’t really think of my blog as a marketing tool anymore. It is an end-in-itself.

Dugald Christie

I have written that "[t]he rule of law respects us as equals." The notion that we are all equal before the law is an ideal that I think all lawyers share. But, we also know that those who have greater financial resources, have better access to professional legal advice, and representation. For those without money, equality before the law may be a rather remote ideal.

I have never met Dugald Christie in person, but I do know his reputation. For Mr. Christie, helping those who needed it most get access to justice was no ideal: it was the way he practiced law, and lived his life. According to this story on the CBC News website:

Christie was a long-time supporter of equal access to the legal system, regardless of a person's income.

Nineteen years ago, he began offering free legal advice to clients who were least able to pay for it, working out of the Salvation Army.

As head of the Western Canada Society to Access Justice, he helped set up dozens of pro bono clinics in Western Canada.

He successfully sued the Province of British Columbia, challenging the Province's taxation of legal services. The B.C. Court of Appeal declared that the tax on legal services is unconstitutional to the extent that the legislation "purports to tax legal services related to the determination of rights and obligations by courts of law or independent administrative tribunals...." (The Province is applying for leave to appeal the case to the Supreme Court of Canada.)

Tragically, Mr. Christie died yesterday while cycling from Vancouver to Ottawa to bring Prime Minister Harper a petition seeking greater legal assistance for those in need. He was 65.

There will only ever be one Dugald Christie. But, if each of us in the legal profession emulate what he did just a little bit, the world will be a much better place.