Showing posts with label Time Limits. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Time Limits. Show all posts

Sunday, December 27, 2020

Suspension of Limitation Periods in British Columbia Ends March 25, 2021

The British Columbia Government suspended limitation periods effective March 25, 2020. A limitation period sets the time limit in which someone may file a lawsuit. Because of Covid-19, the B.C. Government suspended the limitation periods. So for example, if a two-year limitation period would have expired on say May 19, 2020, the limitation period did not expire, but has been extended until after the suspension is lifted. 

Now, it will begin to run again after March 25, 2021.

I am pleased to see that the suspension is ending. I never understood the rationale. Although Covid-19 has had a significant impact on the court system, causing delays in hearings, it did not significantly affect the ability to file claims in court. Limitation periods set the time limits for filing claims, rather than for having them heard in court. 

The suspension of limitation periods have in some cases caused delays in distributing estates, mainly because someone wishing to make a wills variation claim has 180 days from the date of probate to do so. The Wills, Estates and Succession Act provides for a 210-day waiting period, because someone making a claim has another 30 days to serve the personal representative with the Notice of Civil Claim. In some cases, the personal representative can get consents to an early distribution from those who are entitled to apply to vary a will. but in other cases, that is not feasible, either because they won't sign a consent or can't because they are minors.  In those cases, personal representatives need to wait for the 210 days to expire, but during the suspension, the limitation period of 180 days continues until after the suspension is lifted. Funds held in estates have been tied up at a time when the economy needs funds to flow. 

Tuesday, April 14, 2020

Suspension of Limitation Periods in British Columbia During COVID-19 Emergency

The Provincial Government in British Columbia has suspended most limitation periods during the COVID-19 state of emergency in British Columbia from March 18, 2020 for the duration of the state of emergency. This means that in some cases, persons wishing to file claims will have more time to do so.

As I read the Ministerial Order, the suspension will apply to section 61 of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, which requires that a person who makes a claim to vary a will, must file the claim in court within 180 days of the representation grant. Although this will provide additional time for those who might otherwise have difficulty filing a claim in the current crisis, the downside is that it will also delay the distribution of some estates.

It should be noted that the suspension will not affect those claims for which the limitation period had already expired before March 18, 2020.

The Order in place at the time I am writing is as follows:

Application
1 (1) This order applies during the period that starts on the date this order is made and ends on the date on which the last extension of the declaration of a state of emergency made March 18, 2020 under section 9 (1) of the Emergency Program Act expires or is cancelled. 
(2) This order replaces the Limitation Periods (COVID-19) Order made by MO  86/2020. 
Limitation periods in court proceedings 
2 (1) Subject to subsection (2), every mandatory limitation period and any other mandatory time period that is established in an enactment or law of British Columbia within which a civil or family action, proceeding, claim or appeal must be commenced in the Provincial Court, Supreme Court or Court of Appeal is suspended. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a mandatory limitation period and any other mandatory time period established under the following enactments:
(a) the Builders Lien Act;
(b) Division 5 [Builders Liens and Other Charges] of Part 5 [Property] of the Strata Property Act. 
Statutory decisions  
3 A person, tribunal or other body that has a statutory power of decision may waive, suspend or extend a mandatory time period relating to the exercise of that power. 

Sunday, April 16, 2017

The Rule in Cherry v. Boultbee

If you wait too long to sue on a debt, your claim may be statute-barred by the applicable limitation legislation. But can the personal representative of a deceased person require a beneficiary to bring into account an amount the beneficiary owed to the deceased even though the limitation period for the deceased to bring a claim has expired?

The answer in British Columbia is yes.

The principle is known as the rule in Cherry v. Boultbee, and was recently applied by Madam Justice Church in Re: Johnston Estate, 2017 BCSC 272.

The applicant and the respondent in Johnston Estate were the two sons and sole beneficiaries of their father, William Leonide Johnston's will. William Johnston had lent the respondent son $70,000 in 1996 and the respondent had not made any payment since 2000. Under the applicable limitation legislation, William Johnston's claim would have been statute-barred. (There have been significant changes to British Columbia's limitation legislation in respect of debts.) The applicant, as his father's personal representative following his father's death, sought to have a debt brought into account and deducted from his brother's share.

In holding that the applicant was entitled to deduct the amount owing from the respondent's share, Madam Justice Church described the rule in Cherry v. Boultbee as follows:

[28]         The applicant relies on what is commonly referred to as the rule in Cherry v. Boultbee which provides that where a legatee of a share of the residue is a debtor of the estate, he or she is not entitled to receive his or her legacy without bringing his or her debt into account.   The rule derives from the case of Cherry v. Boultbee (1839), 4 My. & Cr. 442.  It is an equitable principle designed to ensure fairness.  The purpose of the rule was to prevent a beneficiary who owed money to an estate from receiving more than his or her fair share of the estate.  In the case of Re: Akerman, Akerman v. Akerman, [1891] 3 Ch. 212, Kekewich J. stated: 

A person who owes an estate money, that is to say, who is bound to increase the general mass of the estate by contribution of his own, cannot claim an aliquot share given to him out of that mass without first making the contribution which completes it.  Nothing is in truth retained by the representative of the estate; nothing is in strict language set off; but the contributor is paid by holding in his own hand a part of the mass, which, if the mass were completed, he would receive back.

[29]         The rule has been held to apply even where the debt is statute-barred: see  Re: Akerman.

The respondent argued that the rule no longer applied in Canada, citing a decision of Mr. Justice Clark in the Alberta case, Re: Moody Estate, 2011 ABQB 222. But Madam Justice Church declined to follow Moody Estate:

[36]         With all due respect to Clark J., I cannot agree with either his reasoning or his conclusion.  In my view, he begins his analysis from the premise that the “rule permits an executor to recoup the amount owing, even though the deceased would have been unable to do so.”  In my view, that is not an accurate description of the application of the rule.  The rule in Cherry v. Boultbee does not confer on the estate any right to recoup the amount owing but rather operates to ensure fairness in the distribution of an estate, recognizing that the relationship between a testator and his or her beneficiaries is typically not at arm’s length.   The fundamental purpose of the rule is to ensure that beneficiaries are treated fairly and it embodies the principal that he who seeks equity must do equity.  As the court noted in Re: Akerman, nothing is being retained by the representative and nothing is being set off but rather, the contributor is paid by what he is holding in his own hand.  The court in Re: Goy & Co Ltd. [1900] 2 Ch. 149, also noted that the claimant has in his own hands that which is applicable to the payment and should pay himself out of that.  The question of whether the testator or the estate can recover the debt or whether the debt is statute barred is therefore largely irrelevant to the application of the rule.  In my view, the change in approach to limitation provisions by the Supreme Court of Canada in Tolofson does not affect the application of the rule in Cherry v. Boultbee.


In the result, the respondent's debt will be brought into account when his father's estate is distributed. 

Sunday, June 28, 2015

What Does Section 155 of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act Really Mean?



Does section 155 (1)(a) of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act permit an executor or administrator to distribute an estate within 210 days of a grant of probate or letters of administration with will annexed without the consent of a disinherited spouse or child, if all of the beneficiaries named in the will consent?

I have now discussed the meaning of section 155 (1) (a) with several other estate lawyers, and I think the wording of this section is quite ambiguous.

It may be useful to set out the section in its entirety to see the context.


Distribution of estate

155 (1) The personal representative of a deceased person must not distribute the estate of the deceased person in the 210 days following the date of the issue of a representation grant except
(a) with the consent of all beneficiaries and intestate successors entitled to the estate, or
(b) by order of the court.
(2) The personal representative of a deceased person must not distribute the estate of the deceased person after the period referred to in subsection (1) without consent of the court if
(a) a proceeding has been commenced to determine whether a person is or is not a beneficiary or intestate successor in respect of the deceased person's estate,
(b) relief is sought under Division 6 [Variation of Wills] of Part 4 [Wills], or
(c) other proceedings have been commenced which may affect the distribution of the estate.
(3) Nothing in this section
(a) affects any right or remedy against a person to whom an estate has been distributed in whole or in part, or
(b) extends any applicable limitation period.

There are two ways to interpret subparagraph (1) (a). One is that the personal representative (executor or administrator) may make a distribution within the 210 day period if all of the beneficiaries consent provided that the will disposes of the entire estate. This is because (or so those holding this interpretation will argue) if the will disposes of the entire estate there are no “intestate successors entitled to the estate.” There are only intestate successors entitled to the estate if there is no will, or if the will does not dispose of all of the estate. This interpretation seems to correspond with the literal meaning of the words, and my sense is that this may be the most popular interpretation (although my handful of conversation is not exactly a scientific survey of lawyers).

I think the above interpretation is wrong, and it is risky for a personal representative to distribute within the 210 days without the consent of all of those who would be entitled to the estate if there were an intestacy, even though there is a will that disposes of the entire estate.  If I am correct—and we won’t know until there is a court decision on point -- then their consent is required in addition to the consent of the beneficiaries.

My interpretation is based on the underlying purpose of section 155 which is to preserve the estate to allow those who wish to make certain claims, most notably claims to vary the will under Part 4, Division 6 of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, time to do so. If anyone does make a claim to vary the will, the freeze on distribution is extended until the claim is resolved.

This section replaces section 12 of the now repealed Wills Variation Act, and its function is similar. Section 12 of the Wills Variation Act read:

No distribution until 6 months after probate

12  (1) Until 6 months have passed from the issue of probate of the will in British Columbia or the resealing in British Columbia of probate of the will, the executor or trustee must not distribute any portion of the estate to beneficiaries under the will except
(a) with the consent of all persons who would be entitled to apply, or
(b) if authorized by order of the court.
(2) Until the period referred to in subsection (1) has passed, a title passing by devise to a beneficiary must not be registered in a land title office unless under a similar consent or order, except subject to the liability of being charged by an order made under this Act.

The persons entitled to apply under the Wills Estates and Succession Act are the deceased’s spouse (including a common-law spouse), and the deceased’s children. Those are also the persons who would be entitled to a share of the estate if there is an intestacy.

The significance of the 210 day period is that it is the same time period a person claiming the vary a will has to both file a notice of civil claim in court (180 days) and serve it on the personal representative (a further 30 days).

If section 155 is interpreted to mean that only the consent of the beneficiaries are required if the will disposes of the entire estate, then the protection is significantly emasculated. If the will-maker leaves his entire estate to his nieces and nephews, and nothing to his spouse, then it is the spouse who will not want the estate is not distributed before she files her claim to vary the will. The nieces and nephews may be quite content to consent to an early distribution to them. It is no answer to say that the spouse can later pursue the beneficiaries for her share if she is successful in a claim to vary the will. She may, but it could be quite costly if there are many of them, or some live outside of British Columbia, and she may be without any practical recourse if they spend what they receive and have no other significant assets. Why have the provision at all if not to ensure that the estate is available if someone such as a disinherited spouse successfully applies to vary the will.

Furthermore, subsection 155(1) should be read in conjunction with subsection (2), which says that if proceedings are brought that may affect the distribution, including wills variation claims, then the prohibition on distribution is extended, and the personal representative requires the court’s consent to make a distribution. It would be inconsistent to allow the personal representative to distribute within 210 days without the consent of a disinherited spouse or child, or a court order, but then require a court order after that time period if the spouse or child does file a wills variation claim.

The other problem with the interpretation that the personal representative does not have to get consent for an early distribution of those intestate heirs who are not named in the will, is that the personal representative does not really know who is ultimately “entitled  to the estate” until after the time for bringing a claim has passed. If in our example of the disinherited spouse, the spouse does apply to court to vary the will, and is ultimately successful, she will be entitled to a share of the estate by virtue of the court order varying the will. But that will not be determined until well after the personal representative has distributed the estate if he or she has done so within the 210 days after probate.

Section 155 is broader than section 12 of the Wills Variation Act, and is intended to freeze the estate until other potential issues are resolved. For example, a person may seek a court interpretation of a will to determine if he or she is a beneficiary. Or there may be a disagreement about whether a person is a “spouse” as defined by the Wills, Estates and Succession Act. 

Sunday, June 07, 2015

Limitation Period for Contesting the Validity of a Will



What is the limitation period for bringing a claim in British Columbia for contesting the validity of a will under the new Limitation Act?

Perhaps the Limitation Act, SBC 2012, c. 13, is not that new anymore, having come into effect over two years ago on June 1, 2013. But under the transition rules, the previous legislation continues to apply to many claims, and for convenience I will refer to the current Act as the new Limitation Act. In a previous post, I wrote about how the new Limitation Act works.

As far as I know, there have been no reported decisions applying the new Limitation Act to claims contesting the validity of wills in British Columbia. But if an Ontario case, Leibel v. Leibel, 2014 ONSC 4516 (Canlii), is applied in British Columbia, the limitation period may in some cases be as early as two years following the date of death.

Eleanor Leibel died on June 4, 2011. She made two wills on April 9, 2011, one of which is referred to as a primary will, and which her estate trustees probated, and the other, referred to as her secondary will, disposed of assets for which probate was not required in Ontario. She made her wills while terminally ill with brain cancer. She appointed her sister and her separated husband as her estate trustees, and left her estate to her children, Blake Leibel and Cody Leibel. Under her wills, Blake Leibel received a larger share of her assets.

Blake Leibel wrote to the lawyer who drafted the wills a couple of weeks after his mother’s death, expressing concern about the appointment of the trustees, and asking for referrals for independent advice. One of the estate trustees sent copies of the Wills to Blake Leibel who lived in California by Purolator on July 12, 2011.

The Estate Trustees made distributions to Blake Leibel, and, he lent money to a corporation to pay estate income tax liabilities.

On September 5, 2013, Blake Leibel brought an application for a declaration that the 2011 wills were invalid, on the stated grounds that his mother did not have capacity to make the wills, and that she was unduly influenced in making them. Under one of her previous wills, he would have received her entire estate to the exclusion of his brother.

The estate trustees applied to dismiss the application in part on the basis that the limitation period had expired. In reaching her decision that the limitation period for bringing the claim had expired, Madam Justice Greer set out the applicable provisions of Ontario’s legislation as follows:


[35]           In my view, the provisions of the Act apply with respect to Blake’s Application being outside the limit under the Act.  Section 4 of that Act states:
Unless the Act provides otherwise, a proceeding shall not be commenced in respect of a claim after the second anniversary of the day on which the claim was discovered. 
 and Section 5(1) states:
A claim is discovered on the earlier of,
(a)   the day on which the person with the claim first knew,
(i)     that the injury, loss or damage had occurred,
(ii)   that the injury, loss or damage was caused by or contributed to by an act or omission,
(iii) that the act or omission was that of the person against whom the claim is made, and
(iv) that, having regard to the nature of the injury, loss or damage, a proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek to remedy it; and
(b)   the day on which a reasonable person with the abilities and in the circumstances of the person with the claim first ought to have known of the matters referred to in clause (a).
Subparagraph 5(2) of the Act, says that a person with a claim shall be presumed to have known of the matters referred to in clause (1)(a) on the day the act or omission on which the claim is based took place, unless the contrary is proved.


Madam Justice Greer found that by July 31, 2011,Blake Leibel had sufficient information to commence a claim. She wrote,


[39]           In applying the “discoverability principle,” Blake had the knowledge to commence a will challenge on or before July 31, 2011.  By that date he knew the following facts:
(a)   Prior to Eleanor’s death Blake knew that Eleanor had recovered from lung cancer but now had brain cancer. 
(b)   He knew Eleanor had changed her previous Wills.
(c)   He knew the date of Eleanor’s death, as Lorne had called him and Cody on that date.
(d)   He received copies of the Wills prior to July 31, 2011, and he knew who the Estate Trustees were under the Wills.
(e)   He knew what Eleanor’s assets were. He had at least a sense of her income, as she had been sending him monthly cheques before the date of her death and had a sense of the value of her assets. 
(f)   He signed corporate documents for a company now owned by her Estate prior to July 31, 2011.
(g)   He had communicated with Ms. Rintoul about his concerns and she gave him the names of three estates counsel to consider, as independent legal advisors. 
Blake, therefore, had all of the information needed to begin a will challenge.  He chose, instead, to take many of his benefits under the Wills before he commenced his Application.  


Madam Justice Greer held that the two year limitation began to run from the date of death, on June 4, 2011. In this respect, the judgment may be open to the criticism that Madam Justice Greer did not apply the discovery principle (although perhaps the presumption in subsection 5(2) applied), but in view of her finding that Blake Leibel had sufficient knowledge by July 31, 2011, and he commenced his application more than two years after that date, he would have been out of time in any event. 

Because the decision is an Ontario decision, it is not binding on British Columbia courts, but may be persuasive in view of the similarities between the provisions of the Ontario legislation and British Columbia’s new Limitation Act. Section 6(1) of B.C.'s Act provides for the basic limitation period as follows:


Basic limitation period

(1) Subject to this Act, a court proceeding in respect of a claim must not be commenced more than 2 years after the day on which the claim is discovered.


The discovery rule in British Columbia is set out in section 8:


General discovery rules

8  Except for those special situations referred to in sections 9 to 11, a claim is discovered by a person on the first day on which the person knew or reasonably ought to have known all of the following:
(a) that injury, loss or damage had occurred;
(b) that the injury, loss or damage was caused by or contributed to by an act or omission;
(c) that the act or omission was that of the person against whom the claim is or may be made;
(d) that, having regard to the nature of the injury, loss or damage, a court proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek to remedy the injury, loss or damage.


Although the limitation period may in some cases begin to run from a date later than the date of death by virtue of the discovery rule, the safe course for anyone wishing to challenge the validity of a will is to file an application in court before the second anniversary of the date of the will-maker’s death.

It should be noted that there are different limitations for different types of estate litigation. For example, wills variation claims under the Wills, Estates and Succession Act must be brought within 180 days from the date of probate. The limitation period is shorter, but does not begin to run until probate.

Sunday, January 05, 2014

Executor Who Distributed Part of an Estate Before the Six-Month's Had Elapsed Since Probate Must Repay Estate or Provide Secutity

In British Columbia, section 12 of the Wills Variation Act prohibits an executor from distributing any portion of an estate until six months from the date of probate has passed, unless the executor either has obtained the consent of all of those who are entitled to apply to vary a will under the Wills Variation Act, or has obtained a court order permitting him or her to do so.

The Wills, Estates and Succession Act contains a similar provision in section 155 (210 days from probate or later if a proceeding to vary the will is commenced).

What happens if the executor distributes before the six-month period elapses? He or she may be required to either repay the funds wrongfully distributed or post security pending resolution of any Wills Variation Act claim.

This is what occurred in a recent decision in Stevens v.Wood Estate, 2013 BCSC 2380. The executor distributed $202,000 to beneficiaries before the six month period had elapsed. One of the deceased will maker’s daughters, Lou-Ann Stevens, brought a Wills Variation Act claim. She brought an application to court to require the executor to repay the funds or post security. The executor argued that the holdback she retained of $28,000 was sufficient to satisfy any successful claim, and if not, she would pay any shortfall. Two of the beneficiaries also said they would indemnify the estate.

Madam Justice Watchuk held that the appropriate remedy was to require the executor to either repay the estate or post security. She wrote:

[29]         The purpose of s. 12(1) is to keep the estate intact to ensure that a successful plaintiff is able to recover that to which they may become entitled. A breach of this statutory provision is a serious matter.  It goes to the heart of the legislative scheme.
 [30]         Until the six-month limitation period has passed, a beneficiary’s entitlement to a share in the estate is not absolute. It is subject to variation if a successful action is brought under the WVA. Unless consents are obtained, the beneficiaries are not entitled to receive and benefit from their share of the estate until the WVA claims have been resolved or a court order has been obtained.
 [31]         Similarly the plaintiff in a WVA action is entitled to have the assets in the estate preserved pending the outcome of their claim. They should not be put in the position of having to pursue after the executor or other beneficiaries to reap the benefits of a successful action.
 [32]         Where there is a breach of the statutory provision and funds are distributed contrary to the legislation, the remedy of a claim against the executor or other beneficiaries, after the completion of the WVAaction, does not sufficiently protect the successful WVA claimant. Those parties may, by then, be without assets or have taken steps that make it difficult to locate their assets.
 [33]         It is the party who has breached the provisions of the statue who must make matters right. This application is not the forum to determine the strength or otherwise of a WVA claim. The WVA claimant is entitled to have the estate reconstituted to its state prior to the wrongful distribution.
 [34]         I find that the appropriate remedy for a breach of s. 12 of the WVA is for the party who has breached the provisions to either repay the estate or to post security in the entire amount which has been wrongfully disbursed.
 [35]         The Executrix in this matter must make matters right. She must, within 30 days of the date of these reasons, repay the estate or post security in the amount of $202,000, being the amount which she has improperly advanced to the beneficiaries. If the security is not posted within 30 days the plaintiff will be at liberty to seek further relief.

Sunday, April 07, 2013

Wills, Estates and Succession Act Transition Provisions


The Government of British Columbia has recently enacted a regulation bringing most sections of the new Wills, Estates and Succession Act into force on March 31, 2014. New legislation can lead to confusion over what law governs when. For example, may a court apply section 59 to rectify a will made before March 31, 2014, perhaps a will made 40 years ago? If a person dies without a will before March 31, 2014, but an application is made for letters of administration after that date, will the new provisions giving a spouse a larger share when there are children apply, or will the old provisions apply.

The Wills, Estates and Succession Act has provisions in sections 185 through 190 setting out the rules for transition. In most cases, the key date is the date of death. Most of the provisions in the Act will apply if the person died on or after March 31, 2014, even if the deceased had made his or her will many years before then.

So, for example, the court can rectify a will under section 59 as long as the will was made by a person who dies on or after March 31, 2014. The new intestacy provisions for those who die without a will only apply to people who die on or after the legislation comes into force. The old intestacy provisions of the Estate Administration Act apply to deaths before then.

There are exceptions to the rule that the date of death determines whether the Wills, Estates and Succession Act applies. One of the exceptions is that the provision in the old Wills Act that says a will is revoked by a marriage (unless the will was made in contemplation of marriage) will apply if the will-maker marries before March 31, 2014 even if he or she dies after that date. The new legislation does not have a similar provision revoking a will on marriage.

This is because Section 186 sets out exceptions in respect of the law relating to the validity of wills, the relevant one being subsection (3):

186  (1) Subject to sections 193 and 194, Part 4 [Wills] applies to a will, whenever executed, if the will-maker dies on or after the date on which Part 4 comes into force.
(2) Subsection (1) does not invalidate a will validly made before the date on which Part 4 comes into force.
(3) Subsection (1) does not revive a will validly revoked before the date on which Part 4 comes into force.

A marriage occurring before March 31, 2014 would revoke the will before the Wills Act is repealed and replaced by the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, and section 186 (3) says that a will revoked before the new legislation comes into effect is not revived.

Another exception is a very specific section dealing with the interpretation of a gift of land or tangible personal property in a will that is subject to a purchase money security interest. Section 47 says that unless you signify a contrary intention in your will if you give land or tangible personal property that is encumbered by a purchase money security interest to a beneficiary, that asset is charged with the debt. For example, if you finance the purchase of your car, and the lender secures the debt against the car, if you leave the car to say your niece in your will, as between your niece and the other beneficiaries of your estate, it is your niece who is responsible for paying the loan. You may, however, say in your will that you want your executors to pay the loan off out of your estate in which case you will have shown a contrary intention.

Section 47 will only apply to wills made on or after March 31, 2014, regardless of the date of the will-makers death.

Wednesday, December 05, 2012

New Limitation Act Information on Ministry of Justice Website


British Columbia's new Limitation Act will come into effect on June 1, 2013. This new legislation makes significant changes to B.C.'s limitation period regime.

I have summarized some of the changes in an earlier post here.

The Ministry of Justice has published information on its website here about the new legislation, including a section-by-section analysis of the changes in a document entitled "The New Limitation Act Explained."

Thursday, October 11, 2012

New Limitation Act to Come Into Effect on June 1, 2013


British Columbia’s new Limitation Act, Bill 34, will come into effect on June1, 2013, according to a news release from the Ministry of Justice.

Limitations legislation sets out time periods in which a person making a claim must start a lawsuit, or lose their right to sue.

The new Act will set a two-year limitation for most types of claims. This replaces the current legislation which replaces the current legislation which sets different periods for different types of claims, often 2, 6 or 10 years.

The two year limitation period will usually start when the claim is “discovered.” Section 8 sets out a general rule of when a claim is discovered as follows:

8  Except for those special situations referred to in sections 9 to 11, a claim is discovered by a person on the first day on which the person knew or reasonably ought to have known all of the following: 
(a) that injury, loss or damage had occurred; 
(b) that the injury, loss or damage was caused by or contributed to by an act or omission; 
(c) that the act or omission was that of the person against whom the claim is or may be made; 
(d) that, having regard to the nature of the injury, loss or damage, a court proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek to remedy the injury, loss or damage.

The new legislation may be simpler than the old Limitation Act, but it is by no means simple.

First, although most claims are subject to a two-year limitation period, this does not cover all types of claims. For example, a claim based on a judgment of a B.C. court has a ten-year limitation period. Some claims, including claims based on a sexual assault or certain claims for possession of land do not have any limitation period.

Secondly, there are special rules for when certain kinds of claims are discovered, such as claims based on fraudulent or breach of trust.

Thirdly, there is an ultimate limitation period for most claims of “15 years after the day on which the act or omission on which the claim is based took place.” This means that some claims could be barred under the new Limitation Act even before they are discovered, but there are exceptions to that for certain types of claims where the ultimate limitation period does not run until discovered, such as a claim for a demand loan which does not begin until the creditor demands payment.

Fourthly, if the person who has a claim is a minor, the limitation period will not begin to run until the minor attains the age of 19, unless the person against whom the claim is made gives notice to proceed to both the minor’s caregiver and the Public Guardian and Trustee, in which case the limitation period begins to run when the notice is given. There are analogous provisions extending the limitation period, and for a notice to proceed, for an adult person who is “incapable or substantially impeded in managing his or her affairs.” If a person loses capacity after the claim is discovered, the running of the limitation clock is suspended while that person is incapable, unless there is a notice to proceed.

Fifthly, the limitation period may also be extended if the person against whom a claim is made acknowledges liability in writing within the limitation period, or in the case of a claim for a debt makes a payment within the limitation period.

Sixthly, there are transition rules for determining whether a claim is governed under the old Limitation Act or the new Act.

If that is not enough, there are many claims that are not governed by the Limitation Act, but are governed by limitation periods set out in other legislation. For example the time limit for bringing a claim under the Wills Variation Act is set out in that Act.

Thursday, April 19, 2012

New Limitation Act Has Passed First Reading

Bill 34, a new Limitation Act has been introduced into the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia on April 16, 2012. It has passed First Reading.

The proposed new legislation simplifies the current Limitation Act to some extent, adopting a limitation period of two years from the date the person suing knew, or should reasonably have known, that he or she had a claim. The current Limitation Act has a variety of different limitaiton periods, including 2 years, 6 years and 10 years for different types of claims.

It should be noted that not all claims will be covered by the two year limitation period under the proposed new legislation, and some types of claims will continue to be governed by limitation periods set out in other statutes, such as the Wills Variation Act.

The new Act will, if passed, reduce the ultimate limitation period for most claims from 30 years to 15 years.

Bill 34 includes many of the recommendations in the B.C. Ministry of the Attorney General's “White Paper on Limitation Act Reform,” which I summarized in this previous post.

Friday, December 16, 2011

Court of Appeal Reaffirms When Limitation Period Begins to Run for Delayed-demand Notes

The British Columbia Court of Appeal has reaffirmed the rule that the limitation period of six years in British Columbia does not begin to run until the creditor has made a demand for payment under a promissory note that was made payable after a specified period of time from demand (a delayed-demand note). The case is Ewachniuk Estate v. Ewachniuk, 2011 BCCA 510.

In that case, the defendant’s mother had lent him $750,000 in 1980. He signed a promissory note stating that the $750,000 was “payable one (1) year after demand, without interest.”

After the defendant’s mother’s death, the administrator of her estate demanded payment under the note on November 29, 2008. The defendant refused to pay, and the administrator sued on July 23, 2009.

The Supreme Court of British Columbia relying on previous cases, including Zeitler v. The Estate of Alfonse Zeitler, 2008 BCSC 775 (which I wrote about here), held that the limitation period did not begin to run until a year after the administrator demanded payment. The cause of action, or right to sue, only arises after the demand, and the time for payment has expired. The limitation period does not begin to run until the creditor has a cause of action.

A delayed-demand note may be contrasted with a demand note, which is a promissory note payable “on demand.” In the case of a demand note, the limitation period begins to run when it is signed, even if the creditor does not demand payment. (In the case of a demand note, the running of the limitation period may still be postponed if within six years of the date the note is made, the debtor makes payments or acknowledges the debt in writing.)

The defendant appealed the Supreme Court of British Columbia’s decision, challenging the authority of cases and texts going back 200 years relied upon by the trial judge. He also argued that a delayed-demand note function like demand notes and it is anomalous to treat them differently. In both cases, the defendant argued, there should be a “finite and predictable limitation period.” Furthermore, because the creditor does not have to make a demand, there is effectively no limitation period.

The Court of Appeal rejected the defendant’s arguments and held that the limitation period does not begin to run until after the creditor has demanded payment, and the period of time for payment under the note has expired.

With respect to the argument that there is effectively no limitation period if demand is not made, Chief Justice Finch noted that there are other equitable defenses if a creditor unreasonably delays in perusing a claim that may apply to a claim when the Limitation Act does not apply.

The distinction between a demand promissory note and a delayed-demand promissory note is an important one in practice. I often see these in loans within a family. Parents may make a loan to a child to assist her. The parents may not have any real need for repayment, but may wish the loan to be repaid in some circumstances, such as if there is a breakdown of the child’s marriage. If the loan is a demand loan, they may find out that the limitation period has expired when they demand repayment. A delayed-demand note affords greater protection to the parents, by delaying the time from which the limitation period begins to run.

Sunday, September 26, 2010

White Paper on Limitation Act Reform

The B.C. Ministry of the Attorney General has published its “White Paper on Limitation Act Reform.

The White Paper proposes significant changes to British Columbia’s Limitation Act. I will summarize a few of the highlights of the recommendations in this post. (I have written about our current Limitation Act here.)

If adopted the most of the basic limitation periods will be two years. This stands in contrast with the current legislation which sets out two years, six years or ten years, depending on the type of claim. Some claims would continue under the proposals to have longer basic limitation periods including claims on a judgment (ten years), or claims made by the government.

The basic limitation period would continue to start to run from the date the claimant discovered that he or she had a claim (or should have reasonably discovered the claim), but the language of this section will be simplified.

The ultimate limitation period would be changed to either ten or fifteen years. Currently, it is thirty years for most types of claims, but there is a six year limitation period for medical malpractice claims against hospitals and medical practitioners. The ultimate limitation period applies even if the claim is not discovered until later.

The ultimate limitation period will begin to run from the time of an act or omission giving rise to the claim, rather than when all of the elements of the claim are present. Currently, in the case of a claim in negligence the limitation period does not begin to run until the claimant has suffered damage. For example, if a building is negligently designed, put the damage to the building occurs years after the building is built, the ultimate limitation period does not begin to run until after the damage occurs. Under the proposed changes, the ultimate limitation period will begin to run from the date of the design, even though the damage may occur say fifteen years later.

If someone under the age of 19 has a claim, the running of both the basic limitation period and the ultimate limitation period would be postponed until the minor attains the age of 19, unless notice is given to the minor’s guardian and to the Public Guardian and Trustee to commence a claim earlier, in which case the basic limitation period will begin to run from the date notice is given.

Similarly, the basic limitation period would not begin to run against an adult person while he or she is under a legal disability. But the ultimate limitation period would not be affected by the disability, and would run from date of the act or omission.

The White Paper also includes a proposal to postpone the running of both the basic and ultimate limitation periods for fraud and fraudulent breach of trust, including claims against a trustee who willfully conceals the loss or damage, until the beneficiary becomes fully aware of his or her claim.

Currently, the limitation period for loans payable on demand begins to run from the date a loan is made, rather than from the date of demand. This can create problems for loans made within families. Parents will sometimes make loans to children on demand, without realizing that they may not be able to collect after six years (see my posts on this topic here and here). The White Paper contains a proposal that the basic and ultimate limitation periods would not begin to run until the borrower fails to pay after the lender demands payment.

Certain types of claims, such as claims based on sexual assault would continue to have no limitation period.

Some claims would continue to be governed by other legislation. For example, the limitation period for Wills Variation Act claims is governed by the Wills Variation Act, rather than by the Limitation Act. The White Paper proposes that other limitation periods be listed on a Schedule to the reformed Limitation Act.

You may comment on the White Paper until November 15, 2010 by sending your comments as follows:

Civil Policy and Legislation Office
Justice Services Branch
Ministry of Attorney General
PO Box 9222 Stn Prov Govt
Victoria, B.C. V8W 9J1
Facsimile: 250 387-4525
Email: CPLO_Limitation@gov.bc.ca

Saturday, September 04, 2010

Desbiens v. Smith Appeal

When you apply for a grant of probate in British Columbia, you have to deliver a copy of the will and a notice of your intention to apply for the grant of probate to each of the beneficiaries of the will, and to those who may apply to vary the will under the Wills Variation Act, as well as to anyone who would receive a share of the estate if the deceased had died without a will. This is set out in section 112 of the Estate Administration Act.

The B.C. Court of Appeal has confirmed that these notice requirements are no mere formality. If the executor does not use reasonable diligence to find out the current addresses of those who are entitled to notice, the court may set aside a grant of probate. The case is Desbiens v. Smith, 2010 BCCA 394. I wrote about the trial decision here.

In his will, Charles Eldon Smith left everything to his widow. He had three adult children, with whom he had very limited contact. When he made his will, he did not tell his lawyer, whom he made his executor, about his children.

After his death, Charles Smith’s executor learned of the children. She found addresses in Mr. Smith’s address book. She sent the notice of her intent to apply for probate to these addresses, but the addresses were many years out of date. She did not make other efforts to find the children’s addresses.

Mr. Smith’s children found out about their father’s death three years after his death.

The three children then applied to vary their father’s will under the Wills Variation Act on the basis that he did not make adequate provision for them. But by the time they found out about their father’s death, the 6 month limitation period from the date of the grant of probate for bringing the claim had expired. The executor applied to have their claim dismissed on the grounds that the limitation period had expired.

The Supreme Court of British Columbia held that because the executor had not made reasonable efforts to give notice to the children, neither she nor Mr. Smith’s widow could rely on the limitation period.

The executor appealed. The Court of Appeal took a different approach from the Supreme Court Judge, but the effect is the same: the children may proceed with their Wills Variation Act claim. Mr. Justice Groberman for the Court of Appeal held that it was appropriate to revoke the grant of probate, and then issue a new grant to the executor. The limitation period would then begin to run from the date of the new grant of probate, with the effect that the children will be in time to pursue their claims.

In reaching his decision Mr. Justice Groberman discussed the notice requirements. He wrote at paragraph 28:

The notice requirement in s. 112 is a functional one – it is not a meaningless pro forma exercise. It is designed to ensure that the persons listed receive notice of probate. That function will not be fulfilled unless reasonable inquiries are made to ensure that the notices are sent to the correct addresses.

Then at paragraph 33:

[33] I do not suggest that executors and administrators face onerous requirements in determining the addresses of persons entitled to notice under s. 112 of the Estate Administration Act. All that is required is that the person giving notice exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining the recipients’ addresses. In cases where, having exercised reasonable diligence, they still do not have confidence that they have obtained correct addresses, they must be fully candid in their affidavit in support of probate, and, in appropriate cases, should make application under s. 112(3) of the Act [which allows the court to dispense with notice on a person whose whereabouts are unknown].

Mr. Justice Groberman noted that one of the purposes of the requirement that notice be given is to ensure that anyone entitled to apply under the Wills Variation Act has notice that the estate is being administered. He wrote at paragraphs 66 through 68:

[66] With the enactment of dependent’s relief and wills variation legislation, a grant of probate (or of administration with will annexed) was given an ancillary purpose that was not present in ecclesiastical or common law: that of ensuring that all persons entitled to apply for relief under such legislation had notice that the estate was being administered. Where that purpose is not fulfilled, an important condition precedent for the grant is absent.

[67] The six-month limitation period under the Wills Variation Act is measured from the date that probate is granted for good reason. That is the date on which the court has signified that it is satisfied (by virtue of the requirements of s. 112 of the Estate Administration Act) that reasonable efforts have been made to notify persons having rights to apply under the Wills Variation Act.

[68] Where reasonable efforts to comply with s. 112 of the Estate Administration Act have not been made, probate should not issue. Where a grant of probate has issued notwithstanding a failure to comply with s. 112 of the Estate Administration Act, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to revoke the grant, just as it would have if another condition precedent to the grant of probate had not been satisfied.

Mr. Justice Groberman held that it is appropriate in this case for the court to exercise its jurisdiction to revoke the probate, and issue a new grant to allow the Wills Variation Act claim to proceed. He noted that the children had brought their claims within six months of the date they found out that probate had been granted. Accordingly, they would not be unduly favoured by the revocation.

Sunday, May 30, 2010

Bacic v. Bacic Estate

Limitation periods in British Columbia are tricky. If you have a legal claim, but do not sue before the limitation period, you are out-of-luck. But there are different limitation periods for different types of claims, meaning that whether you can sue after a certain time may depend on what category of claim you might have. The complexity is compounded by the fact that it is not always clear when the limitation clock begins to tick.

In 1986, Marko Bacic bought a new home. His father, Miljenko Bacic, lent him the money to do so. Marko Bacic agreed to repay his father when Marko sold his own home. As security for the loan, Marko’s parents took the title in their names as joint tenants.

Marko Bacic and his parents all moved into the new home, but his parents spent extended periods in Croatia. Marko Bacic paid all of the expenses such as property taxes for the home.

Marko Bacic sold his old home in 1989. The buyers paid some cash and a mortgage for the balance. Marko Bacic arranged for the mortgage to be put in his parent’s names. The buyers paid out the mortgage in 1991. In this way, Marko repaid the loan from his father.

But Marko Bacic didn’t seek to have the titled transferred to him when he repaid the loan. The title to the new house remained in Marko’s parents names, until his mother died when his father became entitled to the title by right-of-survivorship, and then in his father’s name.

Marko Bacic’s father married Nevenca Tomas in 1995, and died on February 1, 1996, without a will. Because Marko Bacic’s father didn’t have a will, his estate would be distributed in accordance with the Estate Administration Act, under which Ms. Tomas receives over half of the estate in these circumstances.

Sometime in 1997, Ms. Tomas indicated that she might claim an interest in the new home. But nothing was done, and Marko Bacic continued to live in the home, and pay the expenses.

On August 23, 2006, Marko Bacic, filed a lawsuit seeking to have the title of the home transferred to him.

Ms. Tomas’s son, Branco Tomas, was appointed administrator of the Miljenko Bacic’s estate, and took the position that the house is an estate asset.

In Bacic v. Bacic Estate, 2010 BCSC 728, Mr. Justice Butler found Marko Bacic’s parents had taken title to the property as security for the loan, which was repaid. He held that they, and then Marko Bacic’s father, held title as trustees for Marko Bacic.

But Branco Tomas as administrator of the estate argued that Marko Bacic waited to long to sue. He argued that the claim was barred by the Limitation Act, and specifically section 3(3)(d) which says:
(3) After the expiration of 10 years after the date on which the right to do so arose a person may not bring any of the following actions:


(d) to recover trust property or property into which trust property can be traced against a trustee or any other person….”

Mr. Tomas argued that the limitation clock began to run either from the date the home was purchased in Marko Bacic’s parent’s name, when the loan was repaid, or at the latest the date Marko Bacic’s father died. In any of those cases, more than ten years passed before Marko Bacic filed his lawsuit on August 23, 2006.

Marko Bacic argued, first, that a different section of the Limitation Period, section 3(4)(j) applies. It says:

(4) The following actions are not governed by a limitation period and may be brought at any time:

(j) for the title to property or for a declaration about the title to property by any person in possession of that property.

Second, he argued that if section 3(3)(d) applies, the time didn’t start to run until the existence of the trust was denied.

Mr. Justice Butler held that the limitation period was ten years in accordance with section 3(3)(d). Although section 3(4)(j) appears to apply as well, the claim is in substance a trust claim, and section 3(3)(d) to recover trust property is more specifically related to Marko Bacic’s claim.

But although the limitation period is ten years, Mr. Justice Butler held that it did not begin to run until Ms. Tomas or her son denied the existence of the trust. He applied section 6(1) which postpones the time at which the limitation period begins to run, as follows:

6(1) The running of time with respect to the limitation period set by this Act for an action
(a) based on fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which a trustee was a party or privy, or
(b) to recover from a trustee trust property, or the proceeds from it, in the possession of the trustee or previously received by the trustee and converted to the trustee's own use,
is postponed and does not begin to run against a beneficiary until that beneficiary becomes fully aware of the fraud, fraudulent breach of trust, conversion or other act of the trustee on which the action is based.

Mr. Justice Butler ordered that the title to the home be transferred to Marko Bacic.

Tuesday, July 01, 2008

Court Holds That Section 66 of the B.C. Estate Administration Act Only Applies to Debt Claims

I wrote a previous post "How to Shorten the Limitation Period for Disputed Estate Debts" in which I described Section 66 of the Estate Administration Act, RSBC 1996, c. 112. This section allows an executor or administrator to provided notice to a person claiming to be a creditor of the estate that the debt is disputed. The person making the claim must then start a court proceeding within six months of the notice, or if the debt is due later, within six months of when the debt is due. If the person making the claim does not sue in time, his or her claim is barred. This provision is quite useful in preventing people with questionable claims from holding up the estate administration for long periods of time.

The wording of section 66 refers to "creditors" and "debts," but does not refer to other types of claims. For example, if you are hurt in a car accident, and you sue the other driver for compensation, you are making a claim for "damages," and not for debt. On the other hand, if a bank lent the deceased money, its claim would be for a debt.

Until the Supreme Court of British Columbia decision last week in Battrum v. MacKenzie, 2008 BCSC 829, it was not clear--at least not to me--whether the ambit of section 66 was restricted to debt, or could be used to bar other claims after six months.

Mr. Justice Macaulay in Battrum held that section 66 notices only applies to debts. The Plaintiff in that case had sued the deceased, alleging that the deceased had acted negligently as a lawyer, and in a conflict of interest in receiving money from the plaintiff to buy shares of a company, which the plaintiff alleges, he never received.

After the deceased's death, his executor delivered to the plaintiff a section 66 notice. After the six months had elapsed, the plaintiff made an application to amend his claim to include additional facts that arguably supported different causes of action, including a claims based on fraudulent misrepresentation. The executor argued that the plaintiff could not raise new claims after the six months period had elapsed.

Mr. Justice Macaulay considered the wording of section 66, and the reference to "creditor" and "debt." He also noted that the Estate Administration Act at one time had a separate limitation period for other types of claims, but that provision has been repealed. He concluded that section 66 could only be used to limit claims for debt.

Although I can't find any fault in Mr. Justice Macaulay's reasoning, I think the result is unfortunate. Someone who makes allegations that the deceased had wronged him, but does not sue, can hold up the estate administration for years. Any executor who distributes the estate knowing that there is a claim, could be held personally responsible for paying the claim if it is successful. It is true most types of claims have limitation periods, but these can be for two, six or ten years. In the case of claims for damages for sexual assault, there is no limitation period in British Columbia.

As a practical matter, I have sent section 66 notices on behalf of executors to people with claims other than debt to press them to file their lawsuit in order to move things along. Usually, they file their claim within six months.

Section 146 of Bill 28, which was introduced in the Legislative Assembly this last session, but did not pass, would have replaced section 66 of the Estate Administration Act. The proposed new section was drafted more broadly to allow the executor or administrator to send a notice to "a person, other than a creditor, with a claim against the estate," as well as to a "creditor." The section uses the word "claim" in place of "debt." I hope this provision remains the same when the proposed new Act is introduced again in the Legislative Assembly.

Saturday, June 07, 2008

Desbiens v. Bernacki: Court Allows Wills Variation Act Applicants to Proceed With Claim Filed After Expiration of Limitation Period

In British Columbia, a child or spouse who wishes to apply to court to vary the will of his or her deceased parent or spouse under the Wills Variation Act must file the application in court within six month’s of the date the court grants probate of the will (or letters of administration with will annexed). This is set out in section 3, and discussed in my post "Time Limits for Bringing a Wills Variation Act Claim."

Section 112(1) of the Estate Administration Act requires the executor or other person applying for a grant of probate or administration to mail or deliver a notice of his or her intention to apply to all of those who are entitled to apply to vary the will under the Wills Variation Act. Accordingly, a spouse or child will usually know in advance that the court will be granting probate or letters of administration, and will have a reasonable amount of time to decide whether to bring a claim under the Wills Variation Act.

But what if a child or spouse does not receive a notice that the executor is applying for probate?

Charles Eldon Smith had four children. After the breakdown of his first marriage, he left his children in the care of the Ontario Children’s Aid Society. He had little further contact with his children, although a couple had made attempts as adults to get in contact with him, and one had visited him.

Charles Smith moved to British Columbia. In December, 2003, he married Angele Smith. He died on March 28, 2004. In his will he appointed his lawyer as his executor and left his estate to his Ms. Angele Smith.

His executor had not known about his children before Mr. Smith’s death. She heard after his death that he had children. She found the names and addresses of three of them (the fourth having been adopted) among his papers. She then mailed the notices required under section 112(1) of the Estate Administration Act to the three children at the addresses she found. None of the notices came back undelivered.

Unfortunately, none of the children received the notices. One of them had a different married name, and all of the addresses were long outdated.

The children found out about their father’s death and about his will after the six month limitation period expired.

The children started a Wills Variation Act application even though the six months from the date of probate had elapsed. The executor and the widow, Angele Smith, applied to court to have the claim dismissed because the limitation period expired.

The children argued that the executor and the widow could not in these circumstances rely on the limitation period. In legal terms, the executor and widow were estopped from invoking the limitation period. The executor had not used reasonable efforts to locate and notify the children of the application for the grant of probate. Nor had the executor applied to court to dispense with the requirement that they be notified.

Mr. Justice Bracken, in Desbiens v. Bernacki, 2008 BCSC 696, agreed with the children’s argument. He held that they could proceed to trial with their claim, despite the expiration of the six-month limitation period.

In his reasons for judgment, Mr. Justice Bracken commented on the diligence required of an executor or person applying to be appointed an administrator to see that those who are entitled to notice are likely to receive the notice as follows:


[40] In my view, when an Executrix or Administrator is sending Notices intended to comply with s. 112(1) of the EAA [Estate Administration Act], she should have some confirmation that the address used is one that will likely reach the recipient. In most cases, the familial relationship is such that the address is known to be current and active. Where, as here, there is simply an address for individuals who have been long out of touch with the Testator without any additional information as to the currency or accuracy of the address, the Executrix is required to take some further reasonable steps to confirm that a Notice sent to that address will likely reach the intended recipient. If that information cannot be obtained through inquiry or investigation then the Executrix must make application for directions or dispensation of Notice under s. 112(3) of the EAA.

[41] In this case, the names in the address book were the Christian names of the plaintiffs only and there was no information to suggest the addresses were current ones. The Executrix knew that the plaintiffs could not have been in a close relationship with the Testator and she could not expect that the addresses in the book were the correct ones for the plaintiffs. In my view, the Executrix did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the then-current addresses of the plaintiffs. There is no evidence in the material filed in support of this application that the Executrix took any steps to verify that the addresses were current. In fact, it appears that the addresses may have been incomplete as well as out of date, as there is evidence before the court that all three of the addresses refer to multi-dwelling buildings, and there were no apartment numbers in the addresses used by the Executrix. The plaintiffs submit that the Executrix should at a minimum have conducted some inquiries to attempt to locate the plaintiffs.



[This decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal, which varied Mr. Justice Braken's order by ordering that the original grant of probate be revoked, and a new grant of probate be issued. The effect is the same: the children can proceed with their claim. I discuss the appeal decision here.]

Sunday, December 09, 2007

Jung v. HSBC Trust Company – Round Three

Henry Lee decided to change his will. He had made a will in 1977, in which he left his entire estate to his brother Horace. (Mr. Henry Lee was not married, and did not have children.) He made the 1977 will himself using a store-bought will form.

So, Mr. Henry Lee bought another will form from a store. He filled out the will form himself in March 1985. The store-bought form was typewritten, with blanks. Mr. Henry Lee arranged for a couple of friends, Mr. and Mrs. Graham, to witness his signature.

In his new will, Mr. Henry Lee left Horace, hand wrote in the blank spaces:

My shares of Lee Bros. Holding Co. My property of 817 North Park St., Victoria, B.C. and 35% of cash & bonds to my brother Horace. 35% to my sister Estelle of cash & bonds. 35% divided evenly for my sisters Elsie, Edythe, Effie and my brothers Harold & Henry of cash & bonds.

Mr. Henry Lee died a few months after completing his new will. His savings and investments were worth over $600,000.

Horace Lee, whom Henry Lee had named executor of his 1977 will, and co-executor with Estelle Lee Jung of the 1985 will, took both wills to a lawyer, Mr. Barbour. The lawyer spoke on the telephone with one of the witness’s, Mr. Graham, who advised Mr. Barbour that when he witnessed the will, the portion with the gifts to Mr. Henry Lee’s siblings was still blank.

If Mr. Graham was correct in what he told Mr. Barbour, the most important part of the 1985 will, the gifts to siblings, would be invalid. In British Columbia, changes made to a will after it is signed and witnessed are not valid, unless made according to the formal requirements set out in the Wills Act. In this case the changes would not have complied if made after the will was signed and witnessed.

Horace Lee decided to change lawyers. He took the 1977 will—which left everything to Horace—to a second lawyer, who assisted Horace Lee in obtaining probate of the 1977 will. Horace Lee then kept Henry Lee’s entire estate for himself.

Estelle Lee Jung knew about the 1985 will, but she accepted Horace Lee’s word that it was invalid. None of the other siblings were aware of the 1985 will.

Horace Lee died in 2001 without a will. His estate was worth about $2.6 million. It was after his death that the 1985 will came to light. By then all of the other siblings, except Estelle Lee Jung had also died.

This is not the first time I have written about this case. I wrote here about the court’s decision after the first time it went to trial. I later wrote about the Court of Appeal decision ordering a new trial. Today’s post is on the decision after the second trial, in Jung v. HSBC Trust Company (Canada), 2007 BCSC 1740.

This case first went to trial in August and September, 2005. Although both Mr. and Mrs. Graham testified at the first trial that Mr. Henry Lee had written in the portion with the gifts before he and they signed the will, the trial judge preferred the evidence of Mr. Barbour that Mr. Graham had said that the will was not complete. The first trial judge found that the 1985 will was valid, except for the most important part. He also held that the clause in the 1985 will revoking the 1977 will was conditional on Mr. Henry Lee’s belief that he was validly changing the beneficiaries will. Accordingly, the first trial judge held that the portions of the 1977 will leaving the estate to Horace Lee remained in effect. (This is called the doctrine of dependant relative revocation.)

The Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the first trial judge. The Court of Appeal held that although the court could only consider Mr. Barbour’s evidence of his conversation with Mr. Graham for the limited purpose of assessing the reliability of Mr. Graham’s evidence that the Mr. Henry Lee had filled in the blanks before they signed the will.

At the second trial, Mr. Justice Silverman found Mr. Henry Lee had completed the gift portion of the 1985 will before he and the Grahams signed the will. Accordingly, the entire 1985 will was valid. The 1985 will revoked the 1977 will. Mr. Horace Lee should not have applied to probate the 1977 will.

In arriving at his decision, Mr. Justice Silverman applied a presumption that the will was properly completed unless there is some indication on the face of the will that it was not. He also accepted the evidence of Mrs. Graham that it was completed. In view of the previous inconsistent statement Mr. Graham had made to Mr. Barbour, Mr. Justice Silverman did not rely on Mr. Graham’s evidence.

Some of the defendants argued that Ms. Estelle Lee Jung had waited too long to sue. They argued that she knew about the 1985 will at the time Horace Lee applied to probate the 1977 will in 1987. The argued that she had either six years or ten years (depending on which section of the Limitation Act applied) to sue.

Mr. Justice Silverman found that the limitation period did not begin to run against Ms. Jung until after Horace Lee’s death. He found that Mr. Horace Lee had fraudulently concealed his knowledge that the 1985 will was valid from his sister Ms. Jung. He also fraudulently concealed his knowledge of the 1985 will from his other siblings. Accordingly, under section 6(1) of the Limitation Act, RSBC 1996, c. 266, the limitation period did not begin to run as against Ms. Jung until she was fully aware of the fraud. She did not wait too long to sue in the circumstances.

Because so much time had passed since Horace Lee had probated the 1977 will, and because Horace Lee had mixed the estate assets with his own, it would have been difficult to revoke the probate the 1977 will. It was too late to undo everything that happened. Instead, Mr. Justice Silverman ordered a payment out of Horace Lee’s estate to those beneficiaries (and in many cases their estates) who would have benefitted from the 1985 will on the basis of the value of Henry Lee’s estate when he died. In addition the beneficiaries are entitled to interest at rates set by the court registrar for prejudgment interest.

The interest begins to run from the date of the probate of the 1977 will in March, 1987. (It seems to me that this does not fully compensate the beneficiaries of the 1985 will, because the investments likely grew in value between the date of Mr. Henry Lee’s death, and the date of probate.)

The court also had to interpret the words “cash and bonds.” Mr. Justice Silverman found that Mr. Henry Lee intended those words to include Canada Savings Bonds, cash, bearer bonds and term deposits.

The usual rule in lawsuits in British Columbia is that the unsuccessful party pays some costs to the successful party. In this case, Mr. Justice Silverman exercised his discretion to depart from the usual rule, and award all of the parties their reasonable legal fees out of Horace Lee’s estate. He found that the litigation was caused by the conduct of Henry Lee and Horace Lee, rather than the parties to the lawsuit. In the trial judge’s words:

Hubert’s contributing action was his honest, but ill-advised decision, to use a store-bought form will without involving a lawyer. Horace’s contributing action was his bad faith and fraudulent behaviour.

Sunday, November 11, 2007

How to Shorten the Limitation Period for Disputed Estate Debts

When administering an estate, an executor or administrator is required to pay the deceased’s debts out of the estate assets. But, what if the executor knows of a claim that he or she does not consider legitimate?

If the person making the claim sues, the executor can then proceed through the litigation process. It may take time, but at least the executor knows that the claimant is pursuing the claim.

But, what if the person who may make a claim doesn’t sue right away?

I have written before about limitation periods for starting a claim. The limitation periods in British Columbia vary depending on the type of claim. The most common limitation periods are two years, six years and ten years.

If you are the executor, you probably don’t want to wait for the limitation period to expire before paying those creditors whose claims you do consider legitimate, or distributing the estate to the beneficiaries.

In British Columbia, Section 66 of the Estate Administration Act, RSBC 1996, c. 122, allows the executor or administrator to give notice in writing that he or she disputes the claim. The notice must refer to section 66. The notice requires the person alleging that he or she is owed money to start a lawsuit within six months of the notice if the alleged dept was due. If the alleged debt is not yet due at the time of the notice, then the person making the claim must start the lawsuit within six months of the time the debt becomes due.

The section 66 notice is an effective way for an executor or an administrator to force someone who might make a claim to decide whether to sue within a reasonable period of time. In this way an executor or administrator can avoid significant delay in administering an estate if there are disputed debts.

Thursday, June 28, 2007

Limitation Period for Constructive Trusts in British Columbia

[Since I wrote this post, a new Limitation Act, has come into effect which significantly changes the law. I summarized the new legislation here.]

As I wrote in my post Limitation Periods in British Columbia, there are different limitation periods for different kinds of claims. Sometimes how you characterize a claim can make the difference between finding that you are out of time, and being permitted to pursue the claim.

In Smith v. Vancouver City Savings Credit Union, 2007 BCSC 771, the plaintiff, Marcia Smith, started a proposed class action suit against Van City on behalf of herself and others whom, she says, Van City overcharged prior to February 1997. Her claim is that Van City's overdraft charges were interest charges exceeding the maximum allowable interest rate of 60 % per year under section 347(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code.

Van City sought to have the claim dismissed on the basis that it was brought after the limitation period expired for filing the suit. Van City argued that the limitation period was six years pursuant to section 3(5) of the Limitation Act, RSBC 1996, c. 266.

Ms. Smith argued that because she was seeking an order declaring that Van City holds the overcharges as a constructive trustee for her and the other members of the proposed class, the limitation period is ten years. Section 3(3)(c) and (d) of the Limitation Act provides that the limitation period for claims against trustees to recover trust property is ten years.

Van City argued that the ten year limitation period for trust claims were for those claims where there was a pre-existing trust. Ms. Smith claim, Van City argued, was not really based on an existing trust. Rather she was asking the court to impose a trust as a remedy for the alleged overcharge.

In her reasons for judgment released on June 2, 2007, Madam Justice Gray held that Ms. Smith could proceed with her claim on the basis that if she is successful in her constructive trust claim, the longer ten-year limitation would apply. Section 1 of the Limitation Act defines “trust” to include a “constructive trust.” Madam Justice Gray applied the reasoning in another recent case, Sun-Rype Products Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 2007 BCSC 640. In Sun-Rype, Mr. Justice Rice held that constructive trusts included remedial constructive trusts.

If Ms. Smith had just asked for an order that Vancouver pay a monetary damages, instead of asking for a constructive trust, her claim might very well have been dismissed on the basis that the limitation period had expired. Even though the facts are the same, by asking for the right legal remedy, she can proceed with her claim. She has not proven that Van City acted wrongfully, and she has not won her case, but she can still have her day (or week or month) in court.

Sunday, June 17, 2007

Somodi v. Szabados

When Margit Kolvek bought a house on 8th Avenue in Vancouver, B.C., Istvan Somodi lived in the house as a tenant. Margit Kolvek moved into the house after she bought it, and Mr. Somodi continued to live there. The house was divided into suites, and there were other tenants over the years. But, except while the house was being rebuilt after a fire, both Ms. Kolvek and Mr. Somodi lived in the house until Ms. Kolvek's death in November 1999.

Their relationship over the years is not entirely clear. Several tenants considered them to be a couple, but Ms. Kolvek denied to her family that she and Mr. Somodi had a romantic relationship. They each filed income tax returns on the basis that they were not married or living in a conjugal relationship.

Ms. Kolvek made a will in 1978, in which she appointed her son, Zoltan Szabados, as her executor, and left her entire estate to him. Mr. Szabados obtained letters probate of the will on January 25, 2000.

Mr. Somodi brought a claim under the Wills Variation Act to vary Margit Kolvek's will. He alleged that they lived in a marriage-like relationship from 1964, until Ms. Kolvek's death. In the circumstances, he argued, she had not made adequate provision in her will for him.

As I have written before, the Wills Variation Act allows a person who has lived in a marriage-like relationship for at least two years before the other's death, may make an application to vary a will under the Wills Variation Act. But, this was not always so. When Ms. Kolvek died, the legislation did not give a common-law spouse the right to apply. A claimant had to have been legally married to the deceased at the time of death. Ms. Kolvek's son argued that even if Mr. Somodi lived in a marriage-like relationship with Ms. Kolvek, he had no right to apply.

Mr. Justice Cullen, in his reasons for judgment released Thursday in Somodi v. Szabados, 2007 BCSC 857, rejected Ms. Kolvek's son's argument that Mr. Somodi could not apply. Mr. Justice Cullen noted that in a previous decision, Grigg v. Berg Estate, 2000 BCSC 36, the court held that then wording of the Wills Variation Act was unconstitutional in its discriminatory affects on common law spouses. Accordingly, like the common-law spouse in Grigg, Mr. Somodi had the right to make a claim under the Wills Variation Act.

Mr. Justice Cullen found that Mr. Somodi did live in a marriage-like relationship with Ms. Kolvek. Although the relationship started out as a landlord-tenant relationship, over time it developed “into a relationship involving intimacy, shared tasks and expenditures, and ultimately, mutual support.”

Mr. Somodi faced another obstacle. There is a six-month limitation period for filing a claim under the Wills Variation Act, and the clock begins ticking from the date the will is probated. In this case Mr. Somodi did not file his claim until after two years had passed since Court granted probate.

But, when Mr. Szabados applied to probate the will, he did not give notice to Mr. Somodi of his intention to apply. Section 112 of the Estate Administration Act requires an executor applying for probate to first give notice his or her intent to apply together with a copy of the will to a common-law spouse (among others). Mr. Justice Cullen held that Mr. Szabados' failure to give notice of his intent to apply to Mr. Somodi precluded Mr. Szabados from relying on the limitation period.

Mr. Justice Cullen varied the will to provide Mr. Somodi with the income from forty percent of Ms. Kolvek's estate during Mr. Somodi's lifetime. In arriving at this award Mr. Justice Cullen took into account the fact that for a part of the time since Ms Kolvek's death, Mr. Somodi had been living in the house, and receiving the rents from the tenants, while Mr. Szabados had been making the mortgage and insurance payments.

Mr. Justice Cullen also held that the purpose of the Wills Variation Act is not to build up the claimant's estate, but rather to provide the claimant with support and maintenance.

This case lends support to the view that although common-law spouses may apply under the Wills Variation Act, the courts may be less generous in making awards to a common-law spouse than a married spouse in similar circumstances. I suspect that if Mr. Somodi and Ms. Kolvek had been married, Mr. Somodi would have received a larger portion of the estate.

I think it is also relevant that at the time of the decision, Mr. Somodi was no longer capable of managing his own affairs. The Public Guardian and Trustee of British Columbia had been appointed to manage his finances. There would likely have been no significant practical benefit to Mr. Somodi of awarding him a share of the capital of the estate.