Sunday, June 27, 2010

Zeitler Estate: Whose Responsible for the Taxes?

Alberdina Zeitler sold two properties to her husband, Alfons Zeitler, in 1987, in return for a promissory note and for Alfons Zeitler assuming a mortgage and a demand loan. When he died on April 26, 2007, Mr. Zeitler still owned the properties.

Mr. Zeitler did not leave a will. He did leave what one judge has described as a “’tangle mess’” of private and corporate affairs.” (I have written two previous posts on other aspects of the lawsuit among his wife, his children and the administrator of his estate that followed Mr. Alfons Zeitler’s death here and here.)

On Mr. Zeitler’s death, under the Income Tax Act, Canada, he was deemed to have disposed of these properties. The effect of this deeming provision is that there will be capital gains tax payable on the increase in value of the properties.

The administrator of Mr. Zeitler’s estate obtained a tax opinion from an accounting firm that Mrs. Zeitler would be responsible for any capital gains tax on the properties arising at Mr. Zeitler’s death. This is because the Income Tax Act has an attribution rule that provides that if property is transferred from one spouse to the other spouse, future capital gains are attributable to the transferor, or in other words, to the spouse who originally owned the property. The attribution rule is intended to prevent a high income spouse from transferring property to his or her low income spouse in order to minimize or avoid tax on future gains from the property. In some cases involving transfers at market value, the spouses may elect out of the attribution rule so that the transferee spouse has to pay tax on future gains. But in this case, the accounting firm opined that the attribution rule would apply to attribute the gains to Mrs. Zeitler, even though the increase in value of the property occurred after the transfer.

If Mrs. Zeitler were unable to pay the tax liability, then Canada Revenue Agency could collect from Mr. Zeitler’s estate, because the Income Tax Act makes the transferee jointly liable for any tax. But the tax liability falls on Mrs. Zeitler in the first instance.

Because Mr. Zeitler died without a will, his estate will be divided in accordance with the rules of intestacy under the Estate Administration Act among Mrs. Zeitler and his three children from a previous marriage in the proportions set out by that legislation. If the capital gains tax is payable by Mrs. Zeitler, the effect will be that she will bear the full tax burden of the properties while having to share the benefit of the properties with Mr. Zeitler’s children. The burden in this case is significant, estimated by the accountants at over $230,000.

Mrs. Zeitler sought an order from the court requiring Mr. Zeitler’s estate to indemnify her for any taxes she will be required to pay on the gains on the property. Her claim in this respect was dismissed by the Supreme Court of British Columbia at 2009 BCSC 500.

She appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in Zeitler v. Zeitler (Estate), 2010 BCCA 216, and held that Mr. Zeitler’s estate is required to indemnify Mrs. Zeitler for any tax liability she may have to pay to Canada Revenue Agency.

Mr. Justice Low held that Canada Revenue Agency’s right to tax Mrs. Zeitler does not determine the rights as between Mrs. Zeitler and her husband’s estate as to who bears the ultimate responsibility between them. He found that there was an implied term in the contract between Mr. Zeitler and Mrs. Zeitler when she transferred the properties to him that he would bear any capital gains tax.

Mr. Justice Low wrote at paragraphs 34 through 36:


[34] The attribution section of the Income Tax Act was not a term of the 1987contract. It did not form part of that transaction, either expressly or implicitly. If the respondent’s position is correct, Ms. Zeitler must live with what the CRA chooses to do with respect to collection of the tax on the capital gain. If it assesses Ms. Zeitler and not the estate, she must pay the tax without recourse against the estate. The respondent says that the court should ignore the fact that the estate received the benefit of the capital gain (as Mr. Zeitler would have had he sold the lots during his lifetime) and that it will merely be a bad break for Ms. Zeitler if she is required to include the gain in her income as though earned by her and not by the estate. This means that whether, as between the parties, Ms. Zeitler or the estate is ultimately responsible for the tax would depend entirely on the whim of the tax collector. It cannot be so.

[35] The 1987 contract was silent on the question of which of the two parties would be responsible for payment of tax on capital gain arising out of a future disposition of the property. There was no need for the contract to be explicit on that topic. With or without knowledge of the attribution provision in the Income Tax Act, it seems to me to be obvious that, if asked at the time they formed the contract which of them was to be responsible for the tax, both parties would have said that Mr. Zeitler would be responsible. He acquired both the legal and the beneficial interest in the property. He was entitled to the gain for his sole use absolutely.

[36] Any other view of the issue would mean that, although Ms. Zeitler contractually divested herself of all interest in the property, she retained a contingent tax liability that was entirely outside her control and for which she was entitled to receive no corresponding benefit. That view of the contract would destroy its business efficacy. It would frustrate the object of the contract. It follows that it is necessary to find as an implied term of the contract that Mr. Zeitler would pay future capital gain tax and save Ms. Zeitler harmless from liability for such tax.

Sunday, June 20, 2010

Haegedorn v. Haegedorn

Sheila Haegedorn inherited a one-quarter interest in land near Kaslo, British Columbia from her grandmother. The other three-quarters interest in the land was left to Sheila Haegedorn’s mother, Robina Haegedorn, and to each of her mother’s siblings. Robina Haegedorn’s mother bought out her siblings.

When Robina Haegedorn died she owned a three-quarters interest in the land. She had three children, including Sheila Haegedorn.

In her will, Robina Haegedorn left Sheila Haegedorn a one-twelfth interest in the land, and each of the other children a four-twelfth interest. She divided the rest of her estate equally among her three children. The effect of this division in her will is that each child will end up with a one-third interest in the land, Sheila Haegedorn already having received a one-quarter interest from her grandmother.

Sheila Haegedorn applied to vary her mother’s will under the Wills Variation Act. This legislation allows a child or spouse to apply to vary a will on the grounds that adequate provision has not been made for her. If the Supreme Court of British Columbia finds that adequate provision has not been made for the child or spouse, the court may make such provision as it thinks is adequate, just and equitable in the circumstances.

Mr. Justice McEwan, in Haegedorn v. Haegedorn, 2010 BCSC 836, dismissed Sheila Haegedorn’s claim, and did not vary the will. He held that although Robina Haegedorn had not treated her children equally in her will, she had rational and valid reasons for leaving her other children larger interests in the land in order to equalize the interests of the three children.

Sunday, June 06, 2010

Consultation Paper on New Probate Rules

The British Columbia Law Institute has published its "Consultation Paper on New Probate Rules," which was prepared by the Probate Rules Reform Project Committee.

The paper includes draft new rules.

One proposed change is to eliminate the division in the Rules between "Contentious" and "Non-contentious" business. (I have always found it strange that when you want to prevent probate to contest a will, you look to Rule 61, which governs non-contentious matters to file a caveat.)

The other major recommendations are set out in the Executive Summary as follows:

The proposed rules in Part Two are intended to accommodate a system in which a single court file for the estate would be opened when the first filing (typically an application for a common form grant) is made. Contested matters that currently must be pursued in separate actions with different court files and file numbers, such as probate in solemn form and revocation, would be initiated instead by interlocutory application within the single estate file. The procedure in each case would be only as elaborate as necessary to resolve the particular matter, ranging from an ordinary chambers argument to summary trial on affidavits to a regular civil trial with oral evidence.

Among the other significant changes to probate procedure proposed in this consultation paper are the following:

- a 21-day notice period that must elapse between the notice of an intended application for a grant of probate or administration and the filing of the application;

-abolition of the need to 'clear off' potential administrators having equal or prior right to a grant;

-provision for new procedures at the probate stage contemplated by the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, such as curative orders to admit wills to probate despite formal defects and rectification of wills;

-abolition of the distributions schedule (Part IV) of the disclosure document;

-disclosure of debts in the disclosure document would be limited to debts encumbering specific assets;

-discontinuance, consent dismissal, and settlement without leave of the court would be permitted in contested probate proceedings as in other civil matters, and default judgment would be possible except in proceedings for revocation;

-to avoid the need for a second chambers application to confirm a registrar's findings on an inquiry for passing of estate accounts or fixing the remuneration of a personal representative, the registrar's findings would be certified unless the court orders otherwise when directing the inquiry, and therefore would be binding on the interested parties, subject to appeal.


If you would like to comment on the proposed new probate rules, you may do so by July 15, 2010, by writing to the attention of Greg Blue Q.C., by mail, fax or email. The mailing address is:

British Columbia Law Institute
1822 East Mall
University of British Columbia
Vancouver, B.C.; V6T 1Z1

The fax number is (604) 822-0144.

The email address is gblue@bcli.org .